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Abstract
Building an unbalanced panel of United States (US) bank holding
company (BHC) and commercial bank balance sheet data from
1986 to 2006, we examine the relationship between short-term
capital buﬀer and portfolio risk adjustments. Our estimations
indicate that the relationship over the sample period is a positive
two-way relationship. Moreover, we show that the management
of such adjustments is dependent on the degree of bank capitaliza-
tion. Further investigation through time-varying analysis reveals
a cyclical pattern in the uncovered relationship: negative after
the 1991/1992 crisis, and positive before 1991 and after 1997.
JEL Codes: G21, G28, G32
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1 Introduction
Capital requirements have become one of the key instruments of modern
day banking regulation providing both a cushion during adverse eco-
nomic conditions and a mechanism for preventing excessive risk taking
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D’Agostino, Geraldo Cequeiro, an anonymous referee as well as the audiences of
the Swiss Conference on Banking and Financial Intermediation and the European
Financial Management Association 2008 for their valuable comments and suggestions.
†email: Terhi.Jokipii@snb.ch; Financial Stability Unit, Swiss National Bank Bun-
desplatz 1, 3003 Bern.
‡email: A.K.L.Milne@city.ac.uk@city.ac.uk; Cass Business School, Faculty of Fi-
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ex ante (see Rochet, 1992a; Dewatripont and Tirole, 1994). Theoretical
work focusing on the eﬀects of capital requirements on bank risk ap-
petite is dominated by a theory of moral hazard, in which information
asymmetries and deposit insurance shield banks from the disciplining
control of depositors. Taking capital as exogenous, this strand of liter-
ature analyzes incentives in asset risk choice. These studies show that
capital adequacy regulation may reduce the total volume of risky assets
(see Merton, 1977; Sharpe, 1978; Furlong and Keeley, 1989). This lit-
erature however, has also shown that with the further assumption of a
risk averse bank utility function 1, bank portfolio composition may be
distorted in the direction of more risky assets. As a consequence, aver-
age risk may increase and risk consistent weights are required to correct
for moral hazard.2 The theoretical literature is thus ambiguous about
the relationship between bank capital and bank risk.
A broader view, moving beyond the theory of moral hazard, is pro-
vided by the charter value theory.3 This theory argues that banks have
something to lose since bankruptcy leads to a loss of future proﬁts. Two
further possible characterizations of the relationship between bank cap-
ital and risk thus exist (see Calomiris and Kahn, 1991; Diamond and
Rajan, 2000). In contrast to the predictions of the moral hazard theory,
banks therefore no longer hold the minimum allowable amount of capital,
rather, they have their own preferred (target) level of capitalization. If
this level is exceeded by regulatory requirements, then there is no longer
a relationship between capital and risk taking. To our knowledge, there
is no theoretical analysis exploring the resulting relationship between
capital and risk, which appears to be ambiguous. The following possible
outcomes exist: (i) higher risk can increase the probability of default
and encourage banks to increase capital, and (ii) higher systematic risk
can reduce charter value and lower capital holdings. If however, regula-
tory capital requirements exceed the banks target level of capital, then
a higher degree of capitalization will lead to a reduction in risk appetite
whereby the charter eﬀects become less important. The quantitative
magnitude of this eﬀect however, may be relatively small.
Within the charter value literature, attention has more recently shifted
towards the capital buﬀer theory4, a dynamic version of the charter value
1A risk averse utility function is usually justiﬁed as reﬂecting the divergence of
interest between managers and shareholders inducing risk averse behavior.
2Koehn and Santomero, 1980; Kim and Santomero, 1988; Rochet, 1992; and
Freixas and Rochet 1997.
3Also referred to as the franchise value (see Marcus, 1984; Boot and Greenbaum,
1993; Demsetz et. al, 1997; Hellman, Murdoch, and Stiglitz 2000, Matutes and Vives
2000), charter value is the value that would be foregone if the bank closes.
4See among others Milne and Whalley, 2001; Peura and Keppo, 2006; VanHoose,
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models in which there are costs both of altering the level of capital and
allowing capital to fall below the minimum required levels. The buﬀer
theory predicts that banks will maintain a level of capital above the
required minimum (a buﬀer of capital). The costs of falling below the
minimum required level of capital are both explicit and implicit. Buser
et al. (1981) argue that implicit costs of regulation may arise from regu-
latory interference designed to control excess demand for insurance (eg.
expanding risk taking). Explicit costs relate to penalties and/or restric-
tions imposed by the supervisor triggered by a breach of the regulation,
possibly even leading to bank closure. The novel contributions of the
capital buﬀer theory are to distinguish the long from the short run rela-
tionships between capital and risk taking and the impact of regulatory
capital from observed bank capital. Here, regulatory capital will have a
limited long run impact on bank risk choice, regardless of risk weighting.
The long run relationship between the capital buﬀer and risk is similar
to that predicted by the charter value theory, and can therefore be either
positive or negative. The short run relationship between capital buﬀer
and risk on the other hand, will depend on the degree of bank capital-
ization. For banks near their desired level (highly capitalized banks), we
would expect a positive relationship. However, for banks approaching
the regulatory required level, the relationship should be negative. An
increase in regulatory capital requirements, in the short run, will reduce
the buﬀer of capital and so has the same impact as a direct reduction in
the capital buﬀer.
Several empirical papers have focused on understanding the rela-
tionship between risk and capital, testing whether increases in capital
requirements force banks to increase or decrease their risk (see Shrieves
and Dahl, 1992; Jacques and Nigro, 1997; Aggarwal and Jacques, 2001;
Rime, 2001). Most of these studies have conﬁrmed the positive relation-
ship between capital and risk adjustments predicted by theory, indicat-
ing that banks that have increased their capital levels over time, have
also increased their risk appetite. Shrieves and Dahl (1992) argue that
a positive relationship between the key variables is in line with several
hypotheses which include the unintended eﬀect of minimum capital re-
quirements, regulatory costs, bankruptcy cost avoidance as well as man-
agerial risk aversion. Jacques and Nigro (1997) on the other hand ﬁnd
a negative relationship between changes in capital and risk levels. They
note that such a ﬁnding may be attributable to methodological ﬂaws in
the risk based guidelines.5 Alternatively, as suggested by Shrieves and
2007a&b.
5Avery and Berger (1991) suggest that while the risk weights constitute a sig-
niﬁcant improvement over the old capital standards, several instances in which the
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Dahl (1992), a negative relationship may exist between capital and risk
adjustments if banks seek to exploit the deposit insurance subsidy.
Evidence on the capital buﬀer theory is however more limited. For
a set of German savings banks, Heid et. al (2004) suggest that the
coordination of capital and risk adjustments depends on the amount
of capital the bank holds in excess of the regulation. Banks with low
capital buﬀers try to rebuild an appropriate buﬀer by raising capital
while simultaneously lowering risk. In contrast, banks with large buﬀers
maintain their capital buﬀer by increasing risk when capital increases.
These ﬁndings are in line with the predictions of the capital buﬀer theory.
The relationship between risk and capital has several important pol-
icy implications. The recent modiﬁcation in the capital requirement
regulation (Basel II) is a structural change that places far more empha-
sis on the range of capital that may be required given the speciﬁc risks
faced by each bank. It has been argued that a more risk sensitive capital
adequacy regulation may reduce banks’ willingness to take risk. How-
ever, if banks already risk adjust their total capital, ie. minimum capital
plus buﬀer capital, more than implied by Basel I, then replacing Basel
I with Basel II may not aﬀect the capital to asset ratio or risk proﬁle of
banks’ portfolio as much as feared. It is therefore clearly of interest to
understand the relationship between risk and capital buﬀer formation.
For a sample of publicly traded US bank holding companies (BHCs)
we investigate the relationship between short run capital and risk ad-
justments. Our estimations show that the management of short term
adjustments in capital and risk are dependent on the size of the buﬀer.
For banks with capital buﬀers approaching the minimum requirement,
the relationship between adjustments in capital and risk are negative.
That is that low capital banks either (i) increase their buﬀers by reduc-
ing their risk, or (ii) gamble for resurrection by taking more risk as a
means to rebuild the buﬀer. In contrast, the relationship between capi-
tal and risk adjustments for well capitalized banks is positive, indicating
that they maintain their target level of capital by increasing (decreasing)
risk when capital increases (decreases). Allowing for the speed at which
banks adjust towards their target capital and risk levels to be bank spe-
ciﬁc, we show that small buﬀer banks adjust to their target capital level
signiﬁcantly faster than their better capitalized counterparts. We are
however, unable to ﬁnd signiﬁcant evidence of a similar trend for ad-
justments in risk. We additionally investigate the time varying nature
of the relationship between capital and risk adjustments, which appears
to exhibit a cyclical pattern: negative after the 1991/1992 crisis, and
positive before 1991 and after 1997.
weights assigned to speciﬁc categories are too crude to reﬂect true risk.
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 outlines the
empirical framework adopted. Section 3 describes the data and deﬁnes
the hypotheses to be tested. Section 4 presents our empirical estimations
and results. Section 5 brieﬂy discusses our ﬁndings and concludes.
2 Empirical Framework
In order to investigate the short run relationship between capital buﬀer
and risk adjustments, we acknowledge that banks will manage their cap-
ital buﬀer by accounting primarily for the risk of default. Similarly, risk
taking will depend on how close the capital buﬀer is to the minimum
requirement. Moreover, in this framework, observed changes in a banks’
capital buﬀer and its portfolio risk can be thought of as a function of
two components; one part which is managed internally by the bank plus
an exogenous random shock. Building on previous work6, our model,
with simultaneously determined variables, can be written as follows:
∆bufit = ∆buf
bank
it + εit (1)
∆riskit = ∆risk
bank
it + µit (2)
where ∆bufit and ∆riskit are the observed changes in the capital
buﬀer and risk respectively. ∆bufbank
it and ∆riskbank
it are the changes in
the capital buﬀer and risk that are managed internally by the bank. εit
and µi and are the exogenously determined random shocks for bank i at
time t.
The framework outlined above further assumes that banks will es-
tablish an internally optimal capital buﬀer and risk level that they will




it = ξzit + ηit (3)
risk
∗
it = ϕuit + ωit (4)
Here zit and uit capture all variables (including ∆bufit in the risk
equation and ∆riskit in the buﬀer capital equation) that determine the
banks’ target level of capital buﬀer and risk. ξ and ϕ are the vectors
of coeﬃcients to be estimated. ∆bufit is assumed to impact the target
level of risk since any short term change in the capital of the bank will
aﬀect the banks’ probability of default. Similarly a shift in the banks’
risk proﬁle will alter the banks distance from the regulatory minimum.
6See Shrieves and Dahl, 1992; Jacques and Nigro, 1997; Aggarwal and Jacques,
2001.
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Over time, exogenous shocks will drive actual levels away from or to-
ward, target levels. Banks will therefore need to adjust both the capital
buﬀer and risk taking to revert back to their internally optimal level.
This adjustment is depicted by ∆bufbank
it and ∆riskbank
it . Full adjust-
ment to the target level however, may be too costly or infeasible. Our
model therefore assumes partial, rather than complete, adjustment in
each period.










it − riskit−1) (6)
Here ξ0 and ϕ0 are the speeds of adjustment of the capital buﬀer and risk
respectively; buf∗
it and risk∗
it are the target levels of capital buﬀer and
risk; and bufit−1 and riskit−1 capture the actual levels of buﬀer capital
and risk in the previous period. bufit−bufit−1 and riskit−riskit−1 then
represent the actual change in capital and risk between two periods,
while buf∗
it − bufit−1 and risk∗
it − riskit−1 denote the desired long run
change. These equations highlight the fact that observed changes in
the buﬀer and risk levels in period t are a function of the diﬀerences
between the target level of capital and risk in period t and previous
period’s actual capital and risk, and any exogenous shock.




it − bufit−1) + κit (7)
∆riskit = ϕ0(risk
∗
it − riskit−1) + φit (8)
We note that the observed changes in capital and risk in any given
time period t is some fraction ξ0 or ϕ0 of the desired change for that
period. If ξ0 (ϕ0)= 1, then the actual buﬀer (risk) level will be equal to
the desired buﬀer (risk) level. That is, adjustment to the target level is
instantaneous. If on the other hand, ξ0 (ϕ0)= 0, nothing changes, since
the actual level of buﬀer (risk) at time t is the same as that observed
in the previous period. Typically then, ξ0 and ϕ0 will lie between these
extremes since adjustment to the desired stock of capital is likely to be
incomplete for several reasons.
3 Hypotheses and Data
To determine how observed short run ﬂuctuations of the capital buﬀer
(∆bufit) impact on short run changes in bank risk (∆riskit), we esti-
mate our model derived in the previous section. It is important to note
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that the target levels of capital (buf∗
it) and risk (risk∗
it) cannot be ob-
served and hence are approximated by various cost and revenue variables
discussed in detail in Section 5.3.1 below.
∆bufit = α1 − ξ0bufit−1 + ξ1Yit + ξ2∆riskit + κit (9)
∆riskit = α2 − ϕ0riskit−1 + ϕ1Zit + ϕ2∆bufit + φit (10)
where ∆bufit and ∆riskit are the observed changes in capital buﬀers
and risk respectively, i = 1,2...N is an index of banks and t = 1,2,...T,
is the index of time observation for bank i at time t. The Yit and Zit
vectors capture the bank speciﬁc variables that determine the target
buﬀer and risk levels respectively. κit and φit are assumed to consist of
a bank speciﬁc component and white noise.
Our null hypothesis can be presented as:
H0 : Short term adjustments in the capital buﬀer and bank risk have
no impact on one another. The alternative hypotheses to be tested are
then as follows:
H1A: The coeﬃcients ξ2, and ϕ2, are positive and signiﬁcant. Ad-
justments in capital buﬀer and risk are positively related for banks with
large capital buﬀers. This hypothesis is in line with the theory that well
capitalized banks will manage their desired probability of default, by main-
taining an target capital buﬀer through positive adjustments in risk.
and
H1B: The coeﬃcients ξ2, and ϕ2, are negative and signiﬁcant. The
adjustments of buﬀer capital varies systematically, but negatively, with
adjustments in risk taking. ie. Riskier banks will hold less capital in
their buﬀer stock. This hypothesis is in line with the notion that banks
with buﬀers near the regulatory minimum will build up their buﬀers of
capital by reducing risk taking.
3.1 Sample Selection
We create an unbalanced panel of US commercial bank and bank holding
companies (BHCs) balance sheet data covering the period between 1986
and 2006. All commercial bank data is obtained from the Consolidated
Report of Condition and Income (referred to as the Call Reports) pub-
lished by the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago.7 Since all insured banks
are required to submit Call Report data to the Federal Reserve each
quarter we are able to extract income statement and balance sheet data
for a large number of commercial banks.8 In addition, we obtain balance
7This data is publicly available at www.chicagofed.org.
8In 1976 we have data for 14,000 banks which diminishes to around 8,000 banks
by the end of the sample.
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sheet data for BHCs from the Fed Funds Y-9 form. By identifying the
high holder to which the individual commercial banks belong, we merge
the two datasets to obtain balance sheet, income as well as risk based
variables for publicly traded bank holding companies.9 See Appendix
for further information on data manipulations.
In general the BHCs in the sample have been well capitalized through-
out the sample. The average bank has exceeded the minimum required
capital ratio by a comfortable margin. The average10 tier one (total)
capital stood at 7.55(9.55) percent of risk weighted assets11 in 1986 but
reached 9.88(13.44) percent by 1994 and has remained relatively stable
since.
Figure 1 documents the evolution of both tier one and total capital
ratios over time. In 1992 both tier one and total capital ratios rose sub-
stantially. Several reasons can be put forward as possible explanations
of this. First, this may simply reﬂect an unusual period of inﬂated bank
proﬁtability and share price appreciation during the 1990s. BHC capital
ratios might thus have risen passively, simply because bank managers
failed to raise dividends or repurchase shares. Second, this was around
the time that the Basel I rules were introduced in the US. The Federal
Deposit Insurance Committee Improvement Act (FDICIA) subsequently
sought to impose greater credit risk on uninsured bank liability holders
and consequently introduced a mandatory set of prompt corrective ac-
tions (PCA) that increased the cost of violating the capital standard.
Hence, direct supervisory pressure may have contributed to the capital
buildup. Although PCA does not directly apply to BHCs, it is relevant,
because it applies to their bank subsidiaries and therefore may aﬀect the
amount of excess capital held at the holding company level.
Dependent and Explanatory Variables
Bank Capital Buﬀers In this paper, we acknowledge that the
capital to asset ratio that regulators deﬁne and monitor is the ratio of
regulatory capital to risk weighted assets. There is however, no reason
to expect that this is the same ratio that banks target internally when
making risk decisions. Banks for example might consider the market
value of capital, targeting a market value of equity below which the
bond market starts charging a risk premium. Alternatively, banks may
actively manage capital so as to remain within a desired range of eco-
9Once the initial dataset is obtained, we further clean the data by keeping only
those bank holding companies for which we have three consecutive quarters of data.
10Weighted by market capitalization.
11Risk weighted assets are deﬁned as the total of all assets held by the bank,
weighted for credit risk according to a formula determined by the countries regulator.
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nomic capital12 hence targeting the level of either book or market equity
needed to carry our future acquisition strategies.
We deﬁne dependent variable ∆bufit, as the observed change in the
amount of capital the bank holds in excess of that required by the reg-
ulator. We adopt this measure of capital since we assume that banks
will manage their capital in such a way as to avoid, or minimize, costs
associated with a breach of regulatory requirements. Since individual
subsidiary banks seldom issue independent equity and are rather wholly
owned by a holding company, equity ﬁnancing generally occurs at the
BHC level. To capture changes in the buﬀer of capital, we focus solely
on the BHCs.
Regulatory requirements placed on banks have undergone several
changes throughout the sample period. At the beginning of our sam-
ple, US regulators employed a simple leverage ratio to assess capital
adequacy: primary capital had to exceed 5.5 percent of assets, while
the total amount of primary plus secondary capital had to exceed six
percent of assets. Consequently, in the period between 1986 and the end
of 1990, we consider a ratio of total capital equal to seven percent as the
regulatory minimum with which we calculate the capital buﬀer. This
criterion is based on the Federal Reserve Boards deﬁnition of zones for
classifying banks with respect to supervisory action.
Eﬀective December 31, 1990, banks were required to hold at least 3.25
percent of their risk weighted assets as tier one capital and a minimum of
7.25 percent of their risk weighted assets in the form of total capital (tier
one + tier two). Finally, Basel I was introduced at the end of 1992. The
minimum tier one and total capital ratios were subsequently raised to
four and eight percent respectively. In addition to the Basel regulations,
US banks are restricted by an additional leverage ratio of primary capital
to total capital requirement imposed by the FDICIA. Current regulations
therefore state that in order to be adequately capitalized, a BHC must
have a tier one capital ratio of at least four percent, a total capital ratio
of at least eight percent and a leverage ratio of at least four percent.
The tier one ratio of a bank is deﬁned as tier one capital over the
banks total assets, where tier one capital gives the ratio of a banks’ core
equity capital to its total risk weighted assets. Due to reporting changes,
data on risk weighted assets are not available as far back as 1986. We
therefore create proxy series for these variables prior to this time.
We adopt the methodology put forward by Beatty and Gron (2001) to
12Economic capital is the amount of risk capital, assessed on a realistic basis, which
a ﬁrm requires to cover the risks that it is running or collecting as a going concern,
such as market risk, credit risk, and operational risk. It is the amount of money
which is needed to secure survival in a worst case scenario.
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estimate risk weighted assets prior to 1990. Our estimated risk weighted
assets variable, (erwa) is calculated as follows:
total loans+(0.2∗agency securities)+(0.5∗municipal securities)+
(corporate securities)
Moreover, we proxy missing values of tier one capital with the series
for total equity. We can then compare pre- and post- Basel periods.
The correlations for both series are good. We ﬁnd that between 1990
and 2006, the correlation between the erwa to total assets series and
the true risk weighted assets to total assets is around 83 percent. The
correlation between the ratio of common equity to total assets and the
tier one capital to total assets ratio is around 97 percent.
Risk From a regulators point of view, banks with a relatively risky
portfolio, ie. with a high credit risk, should hold a larger capital buﬀer.
Otherwise, these banks will be more likely to fall below the minimum
capital ratio, increasing the probability of bankruptcy and likelihood
of facing costs associated with failure.13 Measuring bank risk is not a
simple task since each alternate proxy has its own characteristics and
limitations. Consequently no single proxy provides a perfect measure of
bank risk. Several varying measures of risk have been adopted in the
literature however, no consensus on which is most suitable exists.
In this study we are concerned with portfolio risk, the proportion
of risky assets in the bank’s portfolio. This is the measure of risk on
which bank regulators base their capital guidelines. Even though the
proportion of certain risky assets in a bank’s portfolio may not exactly
reﬂect the overall asset risk of a bank, it may reﬂect project choice by
bank managers and, thus, to some degree the overall asset risk. Several
authors have therefore used the composition of a bank’s portfolio to
capture asset risk (See Godlewski, 2004; Berger, 1995; McManus and
Rosen, 1991; Gorton and Rosen, 1995). Recent literature has shown that
banks are steadily moving towards reliance on non traditional business
activities that generate fee income, trading income and other types of
non interest income and that consequently, bank risk is now largely found
oﬀ balance sheet (DeYoung and Roland, 2001; Stiroh, 2004). Given
the objective of this study, our aim is to correctly estimate risk in a
manner that captures changes in management policy with regard to the
risk proﬁle of the bank over a twenty year history. Therefore, several
asset based measures centered on existing literature are adopted, all of
which come from the commercial bank side of the balance sheet of the
unbalanced panel created in Section 5.3.1.
13See Ancharya (1996).
1010 11
For our ﬁrst measure of risk (risk) we create an index as per Chessen
(1987), Keeton (1989) and Shrieves and Dahl (1992). The index, con-
structed from accounting data, is calculated as follows:
(0.25 ∗ interest bearing balances) + (0.10 ∗ shortterm US treasury
and government agency debt securities) + (0.50 ∗ state and local
government securities) + (0.25 ∗ bank acceptances) + (0.25 ∗ fed
funds sold and securities purchased under agreements to resell) +
(0.75 ∗ standby letters of credit and foreign office guarantees) +
(0.25 ∗ loan and lease financing commitments) + (0.50 ∗ commercial
letters of credit) + (all other assets)
The weighted sum of these asset amounts is then divided by total
assets.
In addition to the risk measure described above, we consider the risk
weighted assets to total assets ratio rwa/ta. The risk weighted assets
are calculated in accordance with the Basel I rules. The rationale for
this proxy is that the allocation of bank assets among risk categories is
the major determinant of a bank’s risk.14 This measure of risk however
does not account for market risk and therefore serves to capture credit
risk only. As a consequence, it captures only one part of the true asset
risk. Moreover, the relative weights assigned to each portfolio category
may not correspond to the actual risk involved. Since there are only
four kinds of relative weights (0, 20, 50 and 100 percent), each category
within the portfolio may consist of assets with varying levels of risk.15
Therefore, it is likely that two banks with the same rwa/ta ratio in fact
have diﬀerent levels of risk exposure.
An additional proxy for risk adopted is the ratio of non-performing
loans16 to total loans and credits, npl. This measure of loan portfolio
quality is an ex-post measure of risk since banks with non-performing
loans are obliged to make provisions for loan losses. In order to aﬀec-
tively capture risk through this methodology, we need to acknowledge
that the risk of loans originated in a given year will not be reﬂected
in past due and non accrual classiﬁcations until the subsequent period.
Therefore the quality of loans must be measured as those past due or
14See Chessen (1987) and Keeton (1989). Jacques and Nigro (1997) argue that the
rwa/ta captures the allocation as well as the quality aspect of portfolio risk. Avery
and Berger (1991) and Berger (1995) show that this ratio is positively correlated with
risk.
15For instance, all commercial loans have the same weight (100 percent) regardless
of the creditworthiness of the borrower.
16Non-performing loans are those that are 90 days or more past due or not accruing
interest.
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non accruals recorded the following year. Finally, we calculate the ra-
tio of commercial and industrial loans to total assets (c&iratio). This
measure is adopted since commercial and industrial loans are generally
riskier than the other categories of loans.17 Empirical studies (Gor-
ton and Rosen, 1995; Samolyk, 1994) ﬁnd evidence that banks with a
c&iratio also have higher levels of non performing assets.
The rwa/ta ratio is generally considered to be a better ex-ante indi-
cator of overall risk than the c&iatio, since it is a more comprehensive
measure. Thus, while the c&iratio focuses only on a speciﬁc portfolio
item, the Basel Accord guidelines group all assets into diﬀerent portfolio
categories and assign diﬀerent risk weights according to the perceived
riskiness of all of the portfolio categories. In contrast to the other two
measures (the c&iratio and the rwa/ta), the npl ratio is an ex-post mea-
sure of risk. Thus, the npl ratio inherently depends on luck or chance in
addition to other factors, in addition to ex-ante risk. The npl ratio may
contain information on risk diﬀerences between banks not caught by the
rwa/ta ratio, and thus is used as a complementary risk measure to the
rwa/ta ratio.
If banks consider the true credit risk of their portfolios when deciding
on the total amount of capital, one would expect the buﬀer capital to
vary positively with any risk measure included as a regressor. Essentially
replicating the true risk proﬁle of banks’ portfolios rather than the risk
weights in Basel I.
In addition to the inﬂuence that risk will have on the capital buﬀer
formation, and vice verse, our model assumes that the target levels of
both risk and capital will depend on a set of bank speciﬁc characteristics,
captured in equations (9.) and (10.) by the Xit and Yit vectors respec-
tively. Diﬀerent corporate ﬁnance theories produce a long list of factors
that drive non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms’ capital structures (see Harris and Raviv,
1991; Frank and Goyal, 2003; Frank and Goyal, 2007). The empirical
corporate ﬁnance literature has converged towards a set of variables that
reliably predict leverage of non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms in the cross section.18 Re-
cently, a set of authors developing models of target bank capital have
conﬁrmed the validity of these variables for a set of ﬁrms in a slightly
diﬀerent legal and institutional environment (Diamond and Rajan, 2000;
17The major loans made by U.S. commercial bank lending activities can be segre-
gated into four broad categories. These are real estate, commercial and industrial,
individual, and others. Commercial and industrial loans includes credit to construct
business plants and equipment, loans for business operating expenses, and loans for
other business uses. It is the second largest loan category in dollar volume among
the loan portfolio of U.S. commercial banks.
18See Titman and Wessels, 1988; Rajan and Zingales, 1995; and more recently
Frank and Goyal, 2007.
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Allen et al., 2006; and Gropp and Heider, 2008). Hence, variables in-
cluded in the Xit and Yit vectors above are drawn from the corporate
ﬁnance literature and can be deﬁned as follows:
Charter value: A more satisfactory account of bank risk taking
emerges when allowance is made for the charter value of the bank. The
larger the charter value, the greater the incentive to reduce risk taking
and to maintain a capital buﬀer that is not in danger of falling below
the regulatory minimum.19 The charter value thus acts as a restraint
against moral hazard in banking (Marcus, 1984; Keeley, 1990; Demsetz
et al., 1997) and can explain the relationship between capitalization and
risk appetite (Demsetz et al., 1997).
Deﬁned as the net present value of its future rents, the charter value
can hence be thought of as being the market value of assets, minus the
replacement cost of the bank (Keeley, 1990; Demsetz et. al., 1997 and
Gropp and Vesala, 2001). As is commonly done in the literature, we





Where bva, bvl and mve depict the book value of assets, the book
value of liabilities and the market value of equity respectively. The ben-
eﬁt of using Tobins q to capture charter value is that it is a market
based measure meaning greater market power in both asset and deposit
markets are reﬂected in a higher q value. Moreover, it allows for com-
parability among banks of varying sizes in our analysis.
All market data is obtained from the Center for Research on Securi-
ties Prices (CRSP). We would expect to observe a positive relationship
between q and the capital buﬀer; such that banks with higher charter
values will hold larger capital buﬀers as a means to protect the valuable
charter. Moreover a negative relationship between q and risk is expected,
indicating that banks with higher charter values have a greater incentive
to reduce their risk. Moreover, we would expect to observe a positive re-
lationship between q and the capital buﬀer; such that banks with higher
charter values will hold larger capital buﬀers as a means to protect the
valuable charter.
Bank size: It is usually argued that larger ﬁrms are safer, better
known in the market, and more exposed to agency problems (Jensen and
Meckling, 1976) explaining why larger ﬁrms generally have lower degrees
of capitalization. The size of a bank may additionally play a role in de-
19Banks with larger charter values will want to protect this value by lowering their
risk taking.
1314 15
termining risk appetite through its impact on investment opportunities
and diversiﬁcation possibilities as well as access to equity capital. Large
banks might be covered by the too-big-to-fail phenomenon whereby any
distress will be bailed out by government assistance. Therefore, to cap-
ture size eﬀects on both buﬀer and risk adjustments, we include the log
of total assets (size) with an ambiguous expected sign in both cases.
Return on assets: Bank proﬁtability may have a positive eﬀect
on bank capital if the bank prefers to increase capital through retained
earnings rather than through equity issues. This might be the case since
equity issues may convey negative information to the market about the
banks value in the presence of asymmetric information. Return on assets
(roa) is included as a measure of bank proﬁts. The expected sign on the
coeﬃcient is positive since the level of buﬀer capital would, in this case,
be expected to move in line with the level of bank proﬁtability.
Loan loss provisions: A bank’s current loan losses will have an
impact on the risk level of a bank since a bank with a higher level of
loan losses will tend to exhibit lower levels of risk adjusted assets in the
future. We proxy these losses (loanloss), by the ratio of new provisions
to total assets. The eﬀect of loan losses on the capital buﬀer is expected
to be positive since banks with greater expected losses can be assumed to
raise their capital levels in order to comply with regulatory requirement
and to mitigate solvency risk. We include the loanloss variable in the
risk equation based on the assumption that banks with higher level of
loan losses will exhibit lower future levels of risk adjusted assets. As a
result, a negative relation should exist between target risk and loan loss
provisions.
Liquidity: Banks with more liquid assets need less insurance against
a possible breach of the minimum capital requirements. Moreover, the
non zero risk weight associated with liquid assets means that banks can
increase their capital buﬀers by liquidating assets. Therefore banks with
more liquid assets generally have smaller target capital buﬀers and may
also be willing to increase their levels of risk. We therefore expect a
negative relationship between liquidity, calculated as the ratio of bond
holdings, share holdings, and interbank assets to total assets, and the
bank’s capital buﬀer.
Dummy variables: The model presented in equations (9.) and
(10.) assumes that the target level of both capital and risk depends
on a set of bank speciﬁc characteristics including its charter value, size,
proﬁtability and liquidity. The speed at which the bank adjusts back to
the target level however is assumed to be constant.
The capital buﬀer theory predicts that banks with small capital
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buﬀers will try to build capital towards an internally deﬁned target
buﬀer while banks with large buﬀers will maintain their buﬀer at the
target level. Hence, adjustments in capital buﬀers and risk are expected
to be positively (negatively) related for banks with larger (smaller) than
average capital buﬀers. Moreover, banks with smaller (larger) capital
buﬀers are expected to adjust both capital and risk faster (slower) than
than well capitalized banks.
To allow for variations in capital and risk management to depend on
the degree of bank capitalization, we create a set of dummy variables
Dcapl and Dcaph. The dummy Dcapl is set equal to one if the capital
buﬀer of a bank is less than two percent; and zero otherwise. Similarly,
the dummy Dcaph is equal to one if the capital buﬀer of a bank is greater
than three percent; and zero otherwise.20
To test the predictions outlined above, we interact the Dcap dummy
variables with the variables of interest. For example, in order to capture
diﬀerences in the speeds of adjustment of low and high buﬀer banks, we
interact Dcapl and Dcaph with the lagged dependent variables bufit−1
and riskit−1. Moreover, to assess diﬀerences in short term adjustments of
capital and risk that depend on the degree of capitalization, we interact
the dummy variables with ∆riskit and ∆bufit in the capital and risk
equations respectively. Bank ﬁxed eﬀects and a full set of time dummies
are included in all the regressions.21
4 Estimation: Methodology and Results
Our model, as outlined in equations (9.) and (10.) is estimated for a
variety of combinations of risk measures outlined in Section 5.3.1. All
variables adopted in the study are deﬁned in Table 1. Table 2 presents
correlations of our main variables in levels and in diﬀerences. Since the-
ory suggests that banks with low risk aversion will choose high leverage
(low capital) and high asset risk (see Kim and Santomero, 1988), we
would expect to ﬁnd a negative correlation between the level of portfolio
risk and and bank capital ratios simply due to the cross sectional vari-
ation in risk preferences. The capital buﬀer theory suggests that there
will be a positive time series correlation between adjustments in capital
and risk. Banks with larger capital buﬀers reduce their endogenous risk
aversion and increasing risk taking while increased opportunities to take
20The three percent threshold is consistent with the 25th percentile of buﬀer capital
in the sample. It also corresponds to the FDIC deﬁnitions of adequately and well
capitalized banks.
21Most important determinants of capital ratios are time invariant ﬁrm speciﬁc
characteristics according to recent research (see Lemmon, Roberts, and Zender,
2008).
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on risky exposures lead banks to increase capital. Only the correlation
between bufit and riskit is negative. All other measures of risk appear
to be positively correlated with the capital buﬀer.
The observed negative relationship is in line with previous ﬁndings.
However, most of the authors to date have proxied risk by non perform-
ing loans (see Shrieves and Dahl, 1992; Jacques and Nigro, 2001 and
Aggarwal and Jaques, 1998 for evidence of this for the US market). We
are unable to replicate this negative ﬁnding with our nplit measure of
risk. By calculating correlations in various time periods, we are however,
able to show that the correlations between the buﬀer of capital and most
risk variables are negative prior to 1993. This relationship becomes pos-
itive after this time, driving the complete sample correlation presented
in Table 2.
These simple correlation studies do not allow other variables to aﬀect
the relationship and therefore do not clarify whether the correlations
noted are due to simultaneous changes in the variables. Moreover, they
do not allow for the numerator/denominator interactions in bufit. Our
dynamic estimations therefore serve to account for various additional
factors that could aﬀect the level of capital and risk held to provide a
deeper understanding of the relationships.
Since we estimate a dynamic model, including the lagged endoge-
nous variables, we employ the the one and two step Blundell-Bond sys-
tem GMM estimators (Blundell and Bond ,1998). However, since they
produce quite similar estimates, we present only the (asymptotically)
more eﬃcient two step estimates. However, the two step estimates of
the standard errors tend to be severely downward biased (Arellano and
Bond, 1991; Blundell and Bond, 1998). To compensate, we use the ﬁnite
sample correction to the two step covariance matrix derived by Wind-
meijer (2005). Applying this methodology rather than the three stage
least squares (3SLS) approach that is common in this literature22, allows
us to account for possible bank speciﬁc eﬀects, providing unbiased esti-
mates.23 The methodology uses lagged levels as instruments in the ﬁrst
diﬀerence equations and lagged ﬁrst diﬀerences (∆bufit (∆riskit)) in the
levels equations. Moreover, in the simultaneous equations estimation, we
include lags of riskit (bufit) as instruments for ∆riskit (∆bufit) to ac-
count for the simultaneity of capital and risk adjustments in the bufit
(riskit) equation. The number of instruments chosen in each model was
22see among others Schrieves and Dahl, 1992; Jacques and Nigro, 1997; Aggarwal
and Jacques, 2001; Rime, 2001; and Heid et al., 2004.
23As a robustness check, we additionally pool the cross sectional data over the
entire sample and estimate using the 3SLS methodology. For our key variables, the
ﬁndings are unchanged and are therefore not presented here for the sake of brevity.
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the largest possible, for which the Sargan -statistic for over identiﬁcation
restrictions was still satisﬁed.
4.1 Full Sample GMM:
We begin by estimating our model with diﬀerent risk measures outlined
above. As a ﬁrst step, equations (9.) and (10.) are estimated as separate
equations.
4.1.1 Single equation estimations
Capital equation: The results from estimating variations of equa-
tion (9.) are presented in Table 3. ∆riskit, ∆rwa/tait, ∆nplit, ∆c&iratioit
are adopted as the risk measures in Model I, Model II, Model III and
Model IV respectively. Model V, introduces a combination of ∆nplit
and ∆rwa/tait. Model VI uses the risk index, ∆riskit, together with
∆rwa/tait. Finally, in Model VII, ∆riskit and ∆nplit are considered to-
gether. In each case, the risk measure is taken to be the observed change
in risk as discussed in detail in Section 5.3.
In general, observed changes in buﬀer capital are positively related
to changes in risk. We do however, observe a negative relationship when
∆c&iratioit is included. The positive ﬁnding indicates that the target
capital buﬀer is adjusted in accordance to the varying risk proﬁle of
the bank. A bank experiencing a positive (negative) shock to risk will
therefore respond by increasing (reducing) its capital buﬀer.
In addition to the risk variables, the estimated coeﬃcients for the
bank speciﬁc variables generally carry the expected sign with mostly
signiﬁcant coeﬃcients. The reported coeﬃcients on the lagged depen-
dent variable bufit−1 are highly signiﬁcant. They show the expected
positive signs and lie within the required interval [0;1]. Hence they can
be interpreted as speeds of capital adjustment. The signiﬁcance of the
speeds of adjustment are in line with the view that the costs of capital
adjustment are an important explanation of the holding of large capi-
tal buﬀers. The fastest speed of adjustment is noted in Model I, where
the composite ∆riskit measure is adopted. Here on average banks close
the gap between their actual and desired level of capital by around nine
percent each quarter, corresponding to a 36 percent adjustment in the
year period following a shock. This speed of adjustment is in line with
ﬁndings of Flannery and Rangan (2006) who show that the mean ﬁrm
acts to close its gap at the rate of more than 30 percent per year.
The expected positive sign on the qit coeﬃcient is found in all of the
six models indicating that banks with higher charter values hold larger
capital buﬀers. sizeit is consistently negative, but only signiﬁcant in
two of the seven cases Model II and Model VI. The negative coeﬃcient
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is in line with the too-big-to-fail hypothesis as well as with the notion
that smaller banks experience greater diﬃculty in accessing the capital
markets. Furthermore, this ﬁnding could provide evidence in favor of
scale economies whereby larger banks will generally enjoy a higher level
of screening and monitoring than their smaller counterparts resulting
in a reduction excess capital held as insurance. Moreover, the negative
coeﬃcient is consistent with the notion that smaller banks are less di-
versiﬁed than their larger counterparts and therefore hold larger capital
buﬀers. roait is consistently positive and mostly signiﬁcant, indicating
the importance that BHCs place on retained earnings to increase their
capital buﬀers. loanlossit is positive and signiﬁcant in ﬁve of the seven
cases, indicative that banks with greater expected losses raise capital
buﬀers in order to comply with regulatory requirements and to mitigate
solvency risk. Finally, the liquidityit variable shows that banks with
higher liquidity ratios generally hold less capital. While the estimates
have the correct sign, the results are only signiﬁcant in two of the seven
models Model I and Model VII.
Risk equation: Similarly to above, equation (10.) is estimated as
a single equation, in this case varying the dependent variable. ∆riskit,
∆rwa/tait, ∆nplit, ∆c&iratioit are adopted for Model I, Model II, Model
III and Model IV respectively.
The coeﬃcients on ∆bufit are generally positive and highly signif-
icant. The only exception being the coeﬃcient associated with Model
IV, where we observe a negative coeﬃcient signiﬁcant at the ten percent
level. The positive relationship indicates that BHCs respond to a posi-
tive (negative) capital shock by increasing (reducing) risk taking. This
ﬁnding is in line with the notion that banks aim to maintain an inter-
nally deﬁned level of risk by either increasing or decreasing the size of
the capital buﬀer.
The speed of adjustment captured by riskit−1 is substantially slower
than that noted in the buﬀer equation above. Again, we ﬁnd that the
speed of adjustment for Model I is the fastest. Here, banks generally
close around three percent of the gap between desired and actual risk
each quarter. This is equivalent to a reduction of around twelve percent
of the gap within the year following an exogenous shock.
qit is negative and signiﬁcant for all of the models. This is in line
with our expectations and with previous studies showing that charter
values act as a disciplining mechanism with regard to risk taking. Simi-
larly, banks with low charter values have little to lose and therefore may
adopt riskier strategies. sizeit is positive in all case but signiﬁcant only
for Model III and Model IV. As above, this is consistent with the notion
that larger banks have higher target levels of risk than smaller banks.
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The loanlossit coeﬃcients are positive and signiﬁcant indicating that
contrary to expectations, banks with higher loan losses are riskier. Fi-
nally, the liquidityit coeﬃcient is positive as expected, but not signiﬁcant
in any of the four cases.
Our ﬁndings indicate that the relationship between observed changes
in capital and risk appears to be positive. BHC’s that have increased
their risk taking over our sample period, have similarly increased their
capital buﬀers and vice verse. These estimations have however failed
to account for the fact that short term adjustments to capital and risk
are simultaneously determined and therefore should be interpreted with
caution. The main purpose of these estimations was rather to determine
how the relationships change with the various measures of risk used. In
general, we see that regardless of the risk measure adopted, except for
∆c&iratioit, the results are qualitatively unchanged. For the rest of this
paper, we therefore adopt ∆riskit as our measure of risk. We chose the
composite risk index ∆riskit for several reasons. First, it appears to be
the most accurate measure of risk for this study since it estimates risk
in a manner that captures changes in management policy with regard
to the risk proﬁle of the bank at any point in time. Moreover, the
expected negative correlation between risk and capital (see Table 2) is
only evident when the ∆riskit measure is adopted. Hence, we assume
that this measure dominates others as discussed previously.
We therefore proceed to estimate equations (9.) and (10.) as a system
of equations, acknowledging the simultaneity associated with decisions
taken in this regard.
4.1.2 Simultaneous equation estimations
For the simultaneous estimations of equations (9.) and (10.), three vary-
ing speciﬁcations are considered. Speciﬁcation I, is our baseline model
deﬁned in equations (9.) and (10.). Speciﬁcation II allows the speed of
adjustment back to the target level to interact with the degree of bank
capitalization. Finally, Speciﬁcation III allows for further interaction
between capital and risk management and bank speciﬁc characteristics.
In this speciﬁcation, both the speed of adjustment, together with the
management of short term adjustments in capital and risk interact with
the size of the capital buﬀer. The results are presented in Table 5.
Under Speciﬁcation I, the impact of capital buﬀer adjustments on
risk and vice verse are both positive and highly signiﬁcant. This is in
line with the results obtained for the single equation estimations. The
fact that simultaneous adjustments of capital and risk are positively re-
lated to each other can be associated with a number of theories of bank
behavior. First, if banks manage their capital in such a way as to avoid,
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or minimize, costs associated with a breach of regulatory requirements,
then banks would tend to increase (decrease) capital when they increase
(decrease) portfolio risk, and conversely. This is the case since the value
of expected bankruptcy costs increase with the probability of bankruptcy
(see Orgler and Taggart, 1983). Through simultaneous adjustments of
both capital and risk, banks are able to manage an internally optimal
probability of default, deﬁned as a function of both capital and risk.
Moreover, the theory of managerial risk aversion in the context of bank-
ing (Saunders et al., 1990) views managers as agents of stockholders that
may have an incentive to reduce the risk of bank insolvency below the
level desired by stockholders. Managers, who are assumed to be com-
pensated with risky ﬁxed claims on the bank, and who have ﬁrm and
industry speciﬁc human capital, have a great deal to lose personally in
the event of a bank failure. In this case, the marginal cost associated
with increases in risk or decreases in capital, is the incremental disu-
tility experienced by bank managers. Thus, banks that have high risk
portfolios may compensate for increases in risk by increasing capital and
vice verse. Each case gives rise to a positive relationship between ad-
justments in risk and capital; and adjustments in capital and risk. The
positive relationships between capital and risk are noted under all three
speciﬁcations. The speeds of risk and capital adjustment under Speci-
ﬁcation I are in both cases positive and highly signiﬁcant. As per the
single equation estimations, the speed of risk adjustment is signiﬁcantly
slower than the capital adjustment over the sample period.
The interaction terms, Dcapxbufit−1 and Dcapxriskit−1 introduced
in Speciﬁcation II, shed further light on how the speed of adjustment
towards the target level depends on the size of the capital buﬀer. Co-
eﬃcients for both Dcaplxbufit−1 and Dcaphxbufit−1 are positive as ex-
pected. The magnitudes of the coeﬃcients, together with their degree of
signiﬁcance imply that banks with small capital buﬀers, those with cap-
ital buﬀers not larger than two percent, adjust their buﬀers faster than
their better capitalized counterparts. This is in line with the recent lit-
erature which allows the speed of adjustment towards targets to vary
with ﬁrm speciﬁc characteristics (see Berger at al., 2008).24 For the risk
equation, coeﬃcients, and degrees of signiﬁcance, of DCAPlxriskit−1
and DCAPhxriskit−1 indicate that low buﬀer banks do not adjust their
risk any faster than highly capitalized banks.
Under Speciﬁcation III, we introduce a further interaction between
the degree of bank capitalization and management of short term risk and
24Their ﬁndings suggest that BHCs adjust toward their target levels of capital
relatively quickly; and that adjustment speeds are faster for poorly capitalized BHCs,
but slower (ceteris paribus) for BHCs under severe regulatory pressure.
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buﬀer adjustments. Both Dcaplx∆riskit and Dcaplx∆bufit are negative
and highly signiﬁcant. This ﬁnding has two possible interpretations (i)
lower capitalized banks reduce their risk taking (capital buﬀers) when
capital (risk) is increased, thereby moving towards their target proba-
bility of default in the long run; or alternatively, (ii) banks with capital
approaching the regulatory minimum will increase risk taking, gambling
for resurrection in order to rebuild their capital buﬀer. As a conse-
quence, buﬀers may temporarily fall even further. Both versions are
consistent with the capital buﬀer theory. In contrast, banks with capital
buﬀers substantially above the requirement increase (reduce) risk taking
when capital increases (falls), thereby maintaining a target probability
of regulatory breach as predicted by theory. Our ﬁndings with regard to
interacted speeds of adjustment conﬁrm those noted under Speciﬁcation
II.
With regards to the bank speciﬁc variables, qit is consistently highly
signiﬁcant in all cases, regardless of the speciﬁcation adopted. This is
in line with predictions made by the capital buﬀer theory. Banks with a
relatively high charter value will hold a larger capital buﬀer and will have
a greater incentive to reduce risk taking. As per the single equations,
larger banks will hold less capital and take more risk. The eﬀect of size
on risk is however, insigniﬁcant.
In addition, we note that BHCs will generally rely heavily on retained
earnings in order to increase their capital buﬀers. This is in line with
Aggarwal and Jacques (2001) who conduct a similar study for the US,
however their sample is limited to commercial banks as well as to a
much shorter time frame. Banks with greater expected losses appear to
raise their capital buﬀers to comply with regulatory requirements and to
mitigate solvency risk, while banks with higher loan losses, surprisingly,
tend to exhibit higher levels of portfolio risk. The coeﬃcients on the
liquidityit variables carry the expected signs but are not signiﬁcant at
any level.
The most important ﬁndings can be outlined as follows: Short term
adjustments in capital and risk are positively related and the relationship
appears to be two way ie. large buﬀer banks maintain a target proba-
bility of default through positive adjustments in both capital and risk
taking. Small buﬀer banks on the other hand, reach a target probability
of default through negative adjustments. This ﬁnding is in line with
the notion that banks with capital buﬀers approaching the regulatory
minimum either (i) reduce their risk taking until the target capital level
is reached or (ii) increase risk taking as a means to gamble for resurrec-
tion consequently reducing the capital buﬀer even further. Moreover, we
ﬁnd that BHCs adjust their capital buﬀers towards a target level faster
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than they adjust their risk. Banks with smaller capital buﬀers adjust
signiﬁcantly faster than larger buﬀer banks.
4.2 Further Investigation
Our ﬁndings above indicate that observed short term capital buﬀer
and risk adjustments is a positive and signiﬁcant two way relationship
throughout the sample period. While these ﬁndings are broadly in line
with previous research in this ﬁeld (see Shrieves and Dahl, 1992; Jacques
and Nigro, 1997; Aggarwal and Jacques, 2001; Rime, 2001; Heid et al.,
2004) the driving force behind this relationship still remains unclear. It
is not clear whether simultaneous adjustments in risk and capital is a
universally adopted phenomenon among banks in the sample, neither
can we be sure whether that relationship remains consistent over time.
The remainder of the analysis therefore focuses on determining whether
simultaneous adjustments are dependent on institutional characteristics
among banks in our sample, and whether or not the relationship uncov-
ered above has varied signiﬁcantly over time.
4.2.1 Sub sample Approach
The eﬀect that loan loss provisions has on adjustments in capital buﬀers
and risks has largely varied between studies undertaken. One group of
authors, (see among others Rime, 2001 and Heid et. al, 2004) are able to
uncover only very little signiﬁcant impact of loan losses on these variables
of interest. Other authors, for example Aggerwal and Jacques (2001),
ﬁnd that US commercial banks with higher loan loss provisions have
higher risk weighted assets. Moreover, Peura and Keppo (2006) show
that for a sample of US banks between 1983 and 200225, those banks
with higher than average loan loss provisions have; (i) on average lower
expected returns; (ii) on average higher standard deviations in expected
returns; (iii) a positive and highly signiﬁcant correlation between capital
levels and the standard deviations of returns. The last observation is
important since the standard deviations of returns should be the key
parameter driving capital levels in the model. Their analysis suggests
that for banks that have suﬀered below average loan losses, the capital
buﬀer theory seems irrelevant. We test this ﬁnding here empirically by
splitting our sample into two groups. Those banks with above average
loan losses and those with below average loan losses. For each quarter,
we take the mean value of loan loss provisions as a threshold and separate
the sample accordingly.
Results for estimating equations (9.) and (10.) by these sub sam-
ples are presented in Table 7 and 8. Empirical results for those banks
25Particularly in the years 1987, 1990, and 1991.
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with above average loan loss provisions are broadly unchanged from the
full sample GMM estimations presented above. Here we see that ad-
justments in capital and risk remain positively related. For banks with
lower than average loan losses however, adjustments do not appear to
have any signiﬁcant impact on one another. This is veriﬁed through the
insigniﬁcant coeﬃcients on ∆riskit in the buﬀer equation, and on ∆bufit
in the risk equation. With respect to the interaction terms, we are able
to conﬁrm the ﬁndings from our previous estimations. Banks with low
buﬀers of capital appear to adjust their capital towards the target level
signiﬁcantly faster than higher buﬀer banks. Moreover, the coordination
of short term adjustments in capital and risk is dependent on the size
of the buﬀer of capital. Small capital buﬀer banks rebuild an appropri-
ate capital buﬀer by raising capital while simultaneously lowering risk.
In contrast, larger buﬀer banks try to maintain their capital buﬀer by
increasing risk when capital increases.
4.2.2 Rolling GMM
Under the GMM approach adopted above, ﬁxed coeﬃcients are esti-
mated so as to capture an average eﬀect that each regressor will have
on the dependent variable over the time period analyzed. Here, any
changes to economic structure, such as changes in a policy regime etc.
will not be captured directly, but rather eﬀects will be averaged out to
provide a single estimate over time. During much of the 1990s, (a large
portion of the time frame during which we conduct this analysis), the
regulatory restrictions imposed on BHC’s underwent signiﬁcant trans-
formation. Basel I was initially introduced in 1990 which, for the ﬁrst
time in history, deﬁned a numerical minimum amount of capital that
banks were required to hold. These rules were subsequently amended
slightly in 1992. Moreover, the FDIC improvement act came into force
in 1991 which included a set of correctative actions that increased the
cost of violating the regulatory minimum. Moreover, restrictions on per-
missible bank activities were removed allowing BHC’s to select from a
broader array of potential risk exposures. The typical BHC’s risk expo-
sure consequently increased, as the diversiﬁcation eﬀects of new business
activities were outweighed by the higher risks associated with the new
lines of business.
In addition, the US economy faced several periods of change in terms
of economic growth and prosperity as well the removal of restrictions
placed on permissible bank activities, increasing the array of potential
risk exposures. Therefore, to capture the changing environment in which
BHCs have been operating and to assess the eﬀects on the capital buﬀer
risk relationship, we obtain a set of rolling coeﬃcients for equations (9.)
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and (10.). We achieve this by estimating a series of rolling GMM equa-
tions over our sample period providing a continuous picture of the buﬀer
risk relationship. We begin with windows of one year, including four time
period observations in each window.26 This gives us one coeﬃcient for
each year. These estimations are conducted only on the above average
loan loss provision banks.
Results for the buﬀer and risk equations under Speciﬁcation I are
presented in Tables 9 and 10 respectively.27 The relationship between
risk and capital adjustments appears to have changed signiﬁcantly over
time.
In particular, the relationship between buﬀer and risk adjustments
appears to be driven by the management of shocks to the capital buﬀer.
Banks have consistently maintained their desired probability of default
by reducing (increasing) risk taking following a negative capital (posi-
tive) shock. We do however see a slight shift in the relationship in the
years directly post regulation. Between 1994 and 1997, we note that a
capital shock has a negative impact on the adjustment of risk. Banks
with an increase in capital reacted by reducing their risk taking, build-
ing up their capital buﬀers to meet requirements by adjusting their risk
taking downwards. This build up of capital is reﬂected in Figure 2.
On the other hand, shocks to risk have started signiﬁcantly inﬂuenc-
ing capital buﬀer adjustments only since 1999. Banks faced with riskier
portfolios reacted by simultaneously increasing their capital buﬀers. Sim-
ilarly, banks that experienced a decline in portfolio risk reduced their
capital buﬀer in order to maintain their internally deﬁned target prob-
ability of default. Interestingly, we do see a change in this relationship
too, after 1993. Moreover, in the three years between 1993 and 1997, an
increase in risk taking induced a build up of capital. Here it seems that
banks tried to build up their capital buﬀers to new target levels through
a positive risk capital strategy. That is, by increasing capital when risk
was high, and reducing capital when risks were low. The coeﬃcients of
interest are presented in Figure 2.
From the time varying analysis conducted, it seems that from around
1999, banks have started to manage an internally optimal probability of
default deﬁned as a function of both capital and risk. Several theories
can be put forward to try to explain the visibly increased importance
that risk adjustments have on capital adjustments. First, the removal
26Both 1986 and 2008 are dropped from the sample since we only have two quarterly
observations in each of these years.
27We additionally estimate time varying equations for Speciﬁcation II and II how-
ever, we do not report the results here for the sake of brevity since they are qualita-
tively unchanged from those observed for the previous estimations.
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of restrictions on permissible bank activities, allowing BHC’s to select
from a broader array of potential risk exposures,28 has consequently
increased BHC’s risk exposures. Moreover, as regulation moves towards
becoming more risk sensitive, it is possible that banks merely recognize
the increased importance to be placed on managing risk taking.
4.2.3 Robustness
In order to verify the results obtained, several additional robustness tests
have been conducted. First, we re-estimate equations (9.) and (10.),
substituting ∆bufit with total capital over total assets (∆capit). The
results are qualitatively unchanged from the ﬁndings presented. The
only notable diﬀerence is the speed of adjustment which appears much
slower than the adjustment back to the target buﬀer level. When ∆capit
is estimated as the dependent variable, we ﬁnd the gap between actual
and target capital is closed by around two percent per quarter, when
compared to nine percent for the buﬀer. In this framework, the gap
between actual and target risk is closed by around one percent per quar-
ter compared to three percent under the buﬀer capital framework. The
speed of adjustment of ∆capit is therefore still signiﬁcantly faster than
that of ∆riskit, but the diﬀerence is not as extreme as in the results
presented. Second, we estimate equations (9.) and (10.), substituting
∆riskit (∆bufit) with a lagged ∆riskit−1(∆bufit−1). While the eﬀects of
the control variables do change somewhat, the sign and the magnitude
of the key variables remain unchanged. Third, we experimented with
the use of buf as an absolute level, again without qualitative changes to
the relationships of key variables. Other tests involved including addi-
tional lags of ∆riskit and ∆bufit in equations (9.) and (10.) respectively.
Furthermore, we adopted diﬀerent thresholds of low versus high capital.
Finally, we introduce a saw tooth in the capital ratios by allowing for
the fact that dividend payments are made only every second quarter.
This was done by introducing a dummy variable set equal to one when
dividends were paid and zero otherwise.
5 Discussion
Building an unbalanced panel of US commercial bank and BHC data
between 1986 and 2008, this paper examines the relationship between
short term adjustments in bank capital buﬀers and risk. Controlling for
various determinants of capital buﬀers and risk levels put forward by the
theoretical and empirical literature in this ﬁeld, we ﬁnd that the rela-
tionship appears to be positive and two way during the sample period.
Moreover, we show that the management of short term adjustments to
28see Stiroh (2004).
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capital and risk is dependent on the degree of bank capitalization.
Our results identify a positive and signiﬁcant relationship between
capital buﬀer and risk adjustments over time. Our ﬁndings are broadly
in line with the capital buﬀer theory, predicting that well capitalized
banks adjust their buﬀer capital and risk positively. The relationship is
negative for low buﬀer banks. These results are conﬁrmed by a set of
single equations as well as by simultaneous GMM equations. In addition,
we note that the management of short term adjustments in capital and
risk are dependent on the amount of capital the bank holds in excess of
the required minimum. Banks with small capital buﬀers rebuild an ap-
propriate capital buﬀer by raising capital while simultaneously lowering
risk. In contrast, well capitalized banks maintain their capital buﬀers by
increasing risk when capital increases. Our estimations further indicate
that the speed with which banks adjust towards the desired level is also
dependent on the size of the buﬀer. We show that small buﬀer banks
adjust capital buﬀers signiﬁcantly faster than their better capitalized
counterparts. However, we are unable to ﬁnd signiﬁcant evidence of a
similar trend for risk adjustment.
By splitting the sample and analyzing banks by degree of loan loss
provisions, we show that the buﬀer theory holds only for high loan loss
banks. Capital and risk adjustments for low loan loss banks on the
other hand, do not appear to impact one another signiﬁcantly. In addi-
tion, the relationship between capital and risk appears to have changed
signiﬁcantly over time. Shocks to the capital buﬀer have consistently,
positively, aﬀected adjustments in risk. For example, a bank faced with
a reduced capital ratio (for example resulting from the recent collapse of
the asset backed commercial paper as a source of funding), have reacted
with a simultaneous reduction in their risk taking. On the other hand,
short term shocks to risk have only really become important for buﬀer
capital adjustments post-1999.
Despite the lack of parameters capturing the return towards the long
run equilibrium, our results do provide substantial support for the buﬀer
view that capital is not an exogenous decision, but rather determined
simultaneously with internal risk choices. Moreover, we ﬁnd that the
relationship between capital and risk is not stable over time. Rather, it
can be driven by either exogenous changes to risk aversion or, by shocks
to either capital or to risk opportunities. Both of these underlying factors
may have a cyclical component. In economic upturns, banks become
more risk loving as they understate their risk relative to the objective
measure of risk. Moreover, shocks to either capital or risk can also
have a cyclical component, however this should not aﬀect the buﬀer risk
relationship signiﬁcantly.
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Table 4: Single Equation GMM: Risk Equation.
Model I Model II Model III Model IV
riskit−1 0.03 (5.55)*** 0.01 (10.34)*** 0.02 (9.45)*** 0.02 (9.34)***
∆bufit 0.55 (10.23)*** 0.65 (7.04)*** 0.48 (5.33)*** -0.77 (1.66)*
qit -0.44 (4.34)*** -0.61 (2.31)** -0.34 (2.49)** -0.48 (6.99)***
sizeit 0.22 (1.02) 0.19 (0.63) 0.21 (1.92)* 0.26 (2.07)**
loanlossit 0.14 (1.00) 0.25 (2.28)** 0.24 (3.96)*** 0.10 (3.02)***
liquidityit 0.19 (0.34) 0.14 (0.41) 0.15 (1.99)** 0.15 (1.73)*
Sargan 15.34 (0.92) 32.34 (0.83) 21.31 (0.79) 12.43 (0.68)
a(1) -1.32 (0.00) 1.23(0.00) 2.12 (0.00) 2.30 (0.00)
a(2) 1.21 (0.87) -2.12(0.64) 1.98 (0.92) -2.34 (0.76)
Note: All regressions include bank ﬁxed eﬀects together with a full set of time
dummies as control variables (not reported here). Dependent variable is ∆riskit
∆rwa/tait, ∆nplit and ∆c&iratioit for Model I, II,III and IV respectively. Other
variables as deﬁned in Table 5.2. t-values presented in parentheses. a(1) and a(2)
represent ﬁrst and second order residual tests. *, **, *** denote signiﬁcance at the
ten, ﬁve and one percent levels of signiﬁcance respectively.
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Table 5: Simultaneous Equation GMM Estimations.
Speciﬁcation I Speciﬁcation II Speciﬁcation III
ceoﬃcient t-value coeﬃcient t-value coeﬃcient t-value
Buﬀer capital equation
bufit−1 0.09 (10.87)***
Dcapl∆bufit−1 0.09 (12.87)*** 0.08 (7.98)***
Dcaph∆bufit−1 0.14 (2.51)** 0.12 (4.87)***
∆riskit 0.42 (9.54)*** 0.35 (8.54)*** 0.38 (11.86)***
Dcapl∆riskit -0.15 (2.50)**
Dcaph∆riskit 0.50 (7.52)***
qit 0.32 (4.87)*** 0.27 (1.72)* 0.42 (3.08)***
sizeit -0.39 (1.91)* -0.44 (1.69)* -0.37 (1.83)*
roait 0.09 (2.01)** 0.10 (2.19)** 0.09 (1.82)*
loanlossit 0.05 (2.47)** 0.12 (2.49)** 0.09 (4.87)***
liquidityit -0.45 (1.42) -0.37 (1.56) -0.42 (0.98)
Sargan 27.79 (2.99) 29.78 (3.45) 17.79 (2.87)
a(1) 2.15 (0.00) 1.98 (0.00) -2.65 (0.00)
a(2) 1.11 (0.54) 2.65 (0.21) 2.88 (1.05)
Risk equation
riskit−1 0.02 (7.54)***
Dcapl∆riskit−1 0.05 (1.98)** 0.04 (2.03)**
Dcaph∆riskit−1 0.06 (3.68)*** 0.05 (2.48)**
∆bufit 0.43 (13.46)*** 0.48 (4.27)*** 0.51 (12.45)***
Dcapl∆bufit -0.22 (5.24)***
Dcaph∆bufit 0.36 (8.35)***
qit -0.21 (3.98)*** -0.13 (4.98)*** -0.15 (6.87)***
sizeit 0.25 (0.85) 0.26 (1.02) 0.32 (0.84)
loanlossit 0.21 (1.75)* 0.15 (1.23) 0.25 (2.47)**
liquidityit 0.67 (0.96) 0.47 (1.21) 0.44 (2.52)**
Sargan 26.87 (3.28) 32.15 (3.11) 16.98 (2.55)
a(1) 2.30 (0.00) -1.98 (0.00) -2.15 (0.00)
a(2) -2.05 (1.05) 1.98 (0.98) 1.87 (1.12)
Note: All regressions include bank ﬁxed eﬀects together with a full set of time
dummies as control variables (not reported here). Dependent variables are ∆bufit
and ∆riskit for the buﬀer and risk equations respectively. Other variables as
deﬁned in Table 5.2. t-values presented in parentheses. a(1) and a(2) represent ﬁrst
and second order residual tests. *, **, *** denote signiﬁcance at the ten, ﬁve and











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































7.1 Commercial bank dataset
All bank level data is obtained from the Consolidated Report of Con-
dition and Income (referred to as the Call Reports) published by the
Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago. Since all insured banks are required
to submit Call Report data to the Federal Reserve each quarter we are
able to extract income statement and balance sheet data for around
14,000 commercial banks. The dataset spans from 1976Q1 − 2006Q2.
This particular dataset poses several problems for us to deal
with in terms of cleaning the data and obtaining a consistent set of data
series. There are several reasons for this. First, through time, deﬁnitions
change for some of the variables of interest, therefore, looking merely at
the Report documentation that that banks are required to ﬁll in is not
always suﬃcient. Therefore it is necessary, on some occasions, to join
series together in order to yield sensible series through time. Moreover,
most of the large banks only provide data on a consolidated foreign and
domestic basis requiring the exploration of which series to use.
RCON vs. RCFD series In general, larger banks only provide data
on a consolidated foreign and domestic basis. Therefore, it is necessary
to use the RCFD series rather than the RCON series for each variable.
For banks that do not have foreign operations however, it is possible
to assume that the two series (RCON and RCFD) will be identical,
although it is necessary to bear in mind that foreign deposits in this
case are not available.
The deﬁnition for total securities changes several times through our
sample. It is therefore necessary for us to combine various individual
series through time to create a consistent variable to work with. Prior
to 1984, it is not possible to combine all of the items that are now
considered as investment securities. We therefore need to approximate
the securities variable. Pre-1984 we combine RCFD0400 (US Trea-
sury securities), RCFD0600 (US Government agency and corporation
obligations), RCFD0900 (obligations of states & political subdivisions)
and RCFD0380 (other bonds, stocks and securities). In 1984q1 how-
ever, we are able to separately add up the items making up invest-
ment securities because a) trading account securities for sale at book
value (RCFD1000) is replaced by securities for sale at market value
(RCFD2146) and b) there is no guarantee that the securities are held to
maturity match across the break in 1984. i.e. there is no guarantee that
RCFD0402 (securities issued by states and political subdivisions in the
US) + RCFD0421 (other domestic securities) + RCFD0413(foreign se-
3940 41
curities) = RCFD0900 (obligations of states and political subdivisions)
+ RCFD0950(other securities). For the pre and post 1984 series to be
consistent, these two summations must be equal. We therefore combine
the series RCFD0390 (book value of securities) and RCFD2146 (as-
sets held in the trading account) for the period 19841 to 1993q4. After
this time, RCFD0390 (book value of securities) is no longer available.
From 1994q1 we therefore proceed by summing up RCFD1754 (total
securities held to maturity), and RCFD1773 (total securities available
for sale). Moreover, RCFD1754 (total securities held to maturity), and
RCFD1773 (total securities available for sale) excludes securities held
in the trading account, which is part of RCFD3545 (total trading as-
sets). We therefore create an additional securities variable (securties2)
which is the summation of RCFD1754 (total securities held to matu-
rity), RCFD1773 (total securities available for sale) and RCFD2146
(assets held in trading accounts). We generally make use of the securi-
ties2 variable since this eliminates a break in the series in 1993.
For total loans, we again see that there is a break in the series in
March 1984. In the third quarter of 1984, the series includes the variable
RCFD2165 (lease ﬁnancing receivables). From March 1984 we adopt
RCFD1400 (total loans & leases, gross) as our total loans variable. Prior
to this however, we replace the series with a sum of RCFD1400 (total
loans & leases) and RCFD2165 (lease ﬁnancing receivables). Similarly
for net loans we have RCFD2122 (total loans, net of unearned income)
for the period between 1984q1 and 2006q2. Prior to this, we again com-
bine RCFD2122 (total loans, net of unearned income) with RCFD2165
(lease ﬁnancing receivables).
Commercial and Industrial loans has a change in deﬁnition as well.
From 1976 until 1984q3, we make use of the RCFD1600 (commercial
and industrial loans). Here, each bank’s own acceptances are included.
From 1984q3 however, the series starts to include holdings of bankers’
acceptances which are accepted by other banks. We therefore replace
this series with a combination of the RCFD1755 (acceptances of other
banks) and RCFD1766 (commercial and industrial loans, other). It
remains impossible to create a consistent series here that would exclude
banker’s acceptances.
A further change in deﬁnition occurs with the Fed Funds series. Con-
sidering ﬁrst the Fed Funds Sold series. From 1976 until 2002q1 we are
able to make use of RCFD1350 (Fed Funds Sold). However, the series
discontinues thereafter. We subsequently form a continuation by sum-
ming RCONb987 (Fed Funds sold in domestic oﬃces) and RCFDb989
(securities purchased under agreement to sell).
Similarly, for Fed Funds Purchased, the series RCFD2800 (Fed Funds
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Purchased) discontinues at the end of 2001. We are then able to replace
the series in 2002q2 with RCFDb993 (Fed Funds purchased in domes-
tic oﬃces) summed with RCFDb995 (securities sold under agreement to
repurchase).
Other issues in the commercial bank dataset In most of the
graphical analysis we ﬁnd a kink in the series in 1997q1. Looking closer
at the cause of this disturbance in the data, we ﬁnd that the number of
institutions falls in 1997q1 to 8,648 from 9,772 in 1996q4. The number
subsequently rises again in 1997q2 when the number of reporting insti-
tutions jumps again to 9,248. Investigating the issue further, we ﬁnd
that there appears to be a fault in the dataset for this period. It seems
that information reported for around 800 banks are all returned with 0
values. We therefore correct the data by setting values equal to those of
the previous period where data is missing.
Dealing with mergers With respect to the treatment of bank merg-
ers in the data, several possible alternative approaches are considered:
Option 0: All observations aﬀected by a merger are simply dropped from
the sample. Note however,if using any lagged growth rates or diﬀerences
in the model, this means dropping future observations as well as the ob-
servation when the merger takes place. This option is applied by many
existing studies in the banking literature (see for example Kashyap and
Stein, 2000). Option 1: This option is preferable when a large bank ac-
quires a very much smaller bank. Here, all past balance sheet and income
observations are rescaled, using a constant ratio, from the beginning of
the sample up to the quarter preceding the merger. This ratio is equal
to the increase in total assets triggered by the merger. Option 2: This
option is preferable to Option 1 when two merging banks are of similar
size. Here, the merged entities are reconstructed backwards as the sum
of the merging banks. In this case a new new bank id, diﬀerent from
any existing id, is created and applied to all subsequent observations.
In this chapter, we adopt a mixture of Options 1 and 2; When merg-
ing banks are of diﬀerent sizes we adopt Option 1 while for a small num-
ber of mergers where the merging banks are of similar size, we create a
new bank id as per Option 2.
Merging the Commercial and BHC datasets The following steps
were undertaken to merge the holding company data with with commer-
cial bank data from the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago. We start with
the commercial bank data set and start by identifying those banks that
belong to foreign call family:
1.
We start by generating a foreign call identity as follows:
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gen fgncall ind = 0
replace fgncall ind = 1 if fgncallfamily > 0 & fgncallfamily ˜ = .
We then created a variable called identiﬁer which tells us the name
of the ﬁnancial high holder. (this is equal to the rssd9348 variable in the
dataset:
gen identiﬁer = high holder /∗ = rssd9348 ∗ /
If however, the high holder is a foreign call family, the variable gives
the number of it instead:
replace identiﬁer = fgncallfamily if fgncall ind == 1
2.
We then make use of the identiﬁer variable to collect holding com-
pany data from the BHC data.
By changing the name of rssd9001 to identiﬁer in BHC data. More-
over, we drop all observations equal to 0.
3.
Finally we merge this dataset back to the commercial bank data.
First we copy the commercial bank dataset and the BHC data into the
same directory. Opening the commercial bank data, we type the follow-
ing:
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